CVE-2026-43017

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: validate mesh send advertising payload length mesh_send() currently bounds MGMT_OP_MESH_SEND by total command length, but it never verifies that the bytes supplied for the flexible adv_data[] array actually match the embedded adv_data_len field. MGMT_MESH_SEND_SIZE only covers the fixed header, so a truncated command can still pass the existing 20..50 byte range check and later drive the async mesh send path past the end of the queued command buffer. Keep rejecting zero-length and oversized advertising payloads, but validate adv_data_len explicitly and require the command length to exactly match the flexible array size before queueing the request.

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0b706fb2294aff3adfd54653bda1b5e356ad4566
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/244b639e6a3a8e26241e201004a3a9f764476631
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/24fa32369cf15d8fc918bdfe94097b12e6acada0
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/562ed1954f0c1bff3422b7b752bd3dacf185edbf
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bda93eec78cdbfe5cda00785cefebd443e56b88b