CVE-2026-46123

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: virtio_bt: clamp rx length before skb_put virtbt_rx_work() calls skb_put(skb, len) where len comes directly from virtqueue_get_buf() with no validation against the buffer we posted to the device. The RX skb is allocated in virtbt_add_inbuf() and exposed to virtio as exactly 1000 bytes via sg_init_one(). Checking len against skb_tailroom(skb) is not sufficient because alloc_skb() can leave more tailroom than the 1000 bytes actually handed to the device. A malicious or buggy backend can therefore report used.len between 1001 and skb_tailroom(skb), causing skb_put() to include uninitialized kernel heap bytes that were never written by the device. The same path also accepts len == 0, in which case skb_put(skb, 0) leaves the skb empty but virtbt_rx_handle() still reads the pkt_type byte from skb->data, consuming uninitialized memory. Define VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE once and reuse it in alloc_skb() and sg_init_one(), and gate virtbt_rx_work() on that same constant so the bound checked matches the buffer actually exposed to the device. Reject used.len == 0 in the same gate so an empty completion can no longer reach virtbt_rx_handle(). Use bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because the length value comes from an untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the kernel log. Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened the USB 9p transport against unchecked device-reported length.

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/21bd244b6de5d2fe1063c23acc93fbdd2b20d112
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c1730099a6fc18b183bd6c1adad3b54adcaeda9
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b40cdd1b1370d76e9e760af4490cb4a351cceead
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e6b4296f170d949ebba937cf6a3f247ec9550d2c
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed41c81d30b211a671667259c3b5feeba0e062d5