CVE-2026-63934

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: gyro: itg3200: fix i2c read into the wrong stack location itg3200_read_all_channels() takes `__be16 *buf' as a parameter and fills the i2c_msg destination as `(char *)&buf'. Since `buf' is the parameter (a pointer), `&buf' is the address of the local pointer slot on the stack of itg3200_read_all_channels(), not the address of the caller's scan buffer. The (char *) cast hides the type mismatch. i2c_transfer() therefore writes ITG3200_SCAN_ELEMENTS * sizeof(s16) = 8 bytes into the parameter's stack slot, which is discarded when the function returns. The caller's scan buffer in itg3200_trigger_handler() is never written to, so iio_push_to_buffers_with_timestamp() pushes uninitialised stack contents to userspace via /dev/iio:deviceX every scan -- both a functional bug (no actual gyroscope or temperature data is delivered through the triggered buffer) and an information leak. The non-buffered read_raw() path is unaffected: it goes through itg3200_read_reg_s16() which uses `&out' on a local s16 value, where that is correct. Drop the spurious `&' so the i2c read writes into the caller's buffer.

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15a0b3f33ffb6c78b3de6f69b026ceb09b973dd1
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/31bbd4b87dd6701fa10e03ba7f6268e49e178d16
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/63203bd072b613c18c237b906b1c9d2dc4527337
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bdc3023d62ed5c7d591f0eb27a5adb37fb892ae
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8654b5e2617819ff4f7c78071dfd0275e971a9b6