CVE-2026-64046

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: tls: prevent chain-after-chain in plain text SG Sashiko points out that if end = 0 (start != 0) the current code will create a chain link to content type right after the wrap link: This would create a chain where the wrap link points directly to another chain link. The scatterlist API sg_next iterator does not recursively resolve consecutive chain links. meaning this is illegal input to crypto. The wrapping link is unnecessary if end = 0. end is the entry after the last one used so end = 0 means there's nothing pushed after the wrap: end start i v v v [ ]...[ ][ d ][ d ][ d ][ d ][rsv for wrap] Skip the wrapping in this case. TLS 1.3 can use the "wrapping slot" for it's chaining if end = 0. This avoids the chain-after-chain. Move the wrap chaining before marking END and chaining off content type, that feels like more logical ordering to me, but should not matter from functional perspective.

References

• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/410351158dfef2d67fea6603680b3a6013c6ed9d
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/49a5faaa471ddcd37b6893970c9916eb836e7c31
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91359966e247c0244c66d50bbb8e74aefa4321c3
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/929b1548e63ac72e104c07d8ee8cbbeeba2fa89a
• https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/acdc12b71c9aa4be5dcd2c8062753c6d2033e235