CVE-2026-76836

Description

AzuraCast exposes the Liquidsoap custom configuration fields through an endpoint that does not require the permission guarding them. The backend_config property in backend/src/Entity/Station.php is annotated with GROUP_GENERAL, and PUT /api/station/{station_id}/profile/edit in backend/src/Controller/Api/Stations/ProfileEditController.php deserializes with that group while requiring only StationPermissions::Profile. AbstractArrayEntity::fromArray() then assigns every public property with no field-level permission check, so custom_config_top, custom_config, custom_config_pre_playlists, custom_config_pre_live, custom_config_pre_fade and custom_config_bottom are writable through it. ConfigWriter::writeCustomConfigurationSection() emits those values verbatim into the generated Liquidsoap .liq script, where the process.run() and process.exec() built-ins execute operating system commands when the backend restarts, which the built-in sync task triggers automatically once needs_restart is set. The dedicated endpoint for the same data, PUT /api/station/{id}/liquidsoap-config, requires StationPermissions::Broadcasting, so a station manager holding only the profile permission reaches configuration that the intended boundary reserves for broadcasting operators.

References

• https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast
• https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/blob/0.23.8/backend/src/Entity/Station.php
• https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/blob/0.23.8/backend/src/Radio/Backend/Liquidsoap/ConfigWriter.php
• https://github.com/AzuraCast/AzuraCast/security/advisories/GHSA-q8wg-3qg7-8pc7
• https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/azuracast-through-liquidsoap-configuration-write-via-profile-edit-serialization-group-bypass